What is the interplay between life, politics, and philosophy? Throughout Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy Roberto Esposito tries to answer this question. To do so he first begins by laying out some terms. Life for example can be subdivided into two parts, bios, and Zōē. Zōē is the latent aspect of life that we would categorize as “facts of life” that simply happen. Bios by contrast is the way in which we interact and influence Zōē (pp. 14-15). Examples of bios would include how social, economic, and political systems influence our life and health, up to and including medical treatments, access to basic amenities, and even given justification for murder (pp. 4-7). Specifically, Esposito focuses on the effect politics plays in developing bios, and how we can create a “biopolitics” that is effective and has a respect for life. This biopolitical analysis is expressed broadly by splitting biopolitical approaches into two distinct categories of being “of (or with) life”, and “over life” (p. 15).
One of the key ideas Esposito expresses throughout the book is that life itself is dynamic (p. 13). Using the work of thinkers like Foucault (p. 29) and Nietzsche (p. 24), he develops a sense that what “life” is, and what is means to be human is subject to change (pp. 23-24). With this changing, there are then the two biopolitical approaches I mentioned previously as options for proceeding. The state may choose to go “with the flow of life” and adapt to these changes to help build a system that works under these new conditions, or they may choose to domineer “over life” and try to bend it into whatever they need it to be. Esposito’s primary concern with the book is to help develop an attitude and approach to politics that is “of (or with) life” (p. 12), and in order to do so we first need to explore why you would not want to simply develop a political program “over life”.
Much of the book itself is covering the ways in which biopolitics “over life” develops philosophically, and the pitfalls it leads to. In fact, Esposito links much of the development of a biopolitics “over life”, to the development of an “anti-philosophical” ideological rhetoric, such as the Nazis (p. 112). For Esposito engaging in philosophy requires an openness to exploring any, and all ideas seriously (p. 10). Only through this serious engagement with the broadest range of ideas can you even begin to develop a political system that is “with life”. Namely one issue that is often “closed off” are the many situations in which people who completely disregard the non-human aspect of life. With this point Esposito draws a comparison to Heidegger and Nazi ideology (pp. 152-155). In both cases they are quick to make a value judgement on any “non-human life” as being subordinate to human life. Due to this closing off, and imposition on life of the consideration for non-human life necessarily Esposito argues they became anti-philosophical. This is because necessarily you constrain the “serious discourse” to uniquely human concerns and perspectives. Once this happens the biopolitics often becomes “thanotopolitics”, and is concerned with determining who should die, more than what can be done to foster, and improve life (pp. 115-117).
In the case of the Nazis, there is a sick and subtle irony to the notion of artificially imposed social Darwinism. The idea is that the interference is “necessary” to maintain the “natural order”. They construct a sacrificial logic based on the idea that you can sacrifice people to maintain a “higher-order principle”. For the Nazi’s this was the biological “superiority” of the Aryan’s vs “…’a life unworthy of life’.” (p. 4 ). To justify their crimes, they had to exclude various groups of even biologically human being’s as being less than human. They also used various medical institutions in order to legitimize this practice (pp. 113-115), and present what they were doing as a return to normalcy (pp. 127-132). There is a somewhat obvious contradiction both in theory and practice. The “weakness”, or more accurate term of change that occurs due to bios is part of life, and more closely aligned to the “natural order” than the direct and intentional intervention. Likewise, the irony of “determining” the classification of life is an act of bios, and not Zōē. The intervention itself is an example of working to be over life, and ironically directly in opposition of what would be the “natural order” (pp. 116-120). This presumption of knowing “what’s best”, and construction of an “other” to protect against is called the paradigm of immunization by Esposito (pp. 45-46).
The idea of the Paradigm of immunization is that there are things in society you must “immunize” yourself against. In the case of the Nazis, it was the systematic eradication of all groups they deemed unworthy, but there are many more subtle examples that are often overlooked. One such example would be the Islamophobic rhetoric born out of the September 11th attacks. There is a dichotomy that is built with “westerners” and “Muslims” (the other), to which one must “defend” themselves. Politically this dichotomy was what permitted many of the invasions in the middle east, and what allowed the American military in many cases to become judge, jury, and executioner in any perceived slights against “western values” (pp. xli-xlii). Likewise medical companies in the US do the same sort of value judgements for who “deserves” coverage, and who is permitted to die. This paradigm of immunization is directly opposed to the view that Esposito holds in which there is a dynamic aspect to life that does not allow it to be so rigidly defined and “kept pure” (pp. 117-118).
The imposition of biopolitics on life in many of these cases is due directly to a presumption that we can control life. As I mentioned earlier Esposito doesn’t even agree that life can be defined statically enough to begin to assume how life “should go” for anyone. To presume that you do is a failure to recognize and understand that you will always be acting upon the bios aspect of life, and in the attempt to ratify the definitions of life you will necessarily be acting in an anti-philosophical manor that makes the development of a biopolitics “of life” impossible, since it’s a prerequisite (pp. 184-185). To build such a biopolitics (as Esposito wants) you must first engage in a philosophical discourse about life that includes a consideration for all life (human and non-human) (p. 154-155). Once you have begun those considerations you can begin to construct an appropriate biopolitics. Keeping in mind that the current biopolitics is always up for further discussion since life itself is so dynamic and changing. This process of re-examination is vital if we want to avoid the same mistakes of the past and continue to upkeep the sort of biopolitics that Esposito is advocating for (pp. 184-185).