“Each generation doubtless feels called upon to reform the world. Mine knows that it will not reform it, but its task is perhaps even greater. It consists in preventing the world from destroying itself… restore among the nations a peace that is not servitude, reconcile anew labor and culture, and remake with all men the Ark of the Covenant”
- Albert Camus
This quote (p. 45) from Albert Camus nicely encapsulates the essence of the concept of murderous consent Marc Crepon develops. Murderous consent for Crepon is the notion of the associated “guilt” with failing to challenge when a state or community engages in violence (p. 28). This violence can take many forms, from wars and direct state violence to more subtle expressions of structural violence like the limiting of access to medical resources and necessities (pp. 6-7). A poignant and more subtle example of murderous consent would be the indifference, or even disdain to which the homeless are treated (pp. 83-85). For Crepon this has been the backbone of much of our history and quotes the character Ivan Grigoryevich from Vasily Grossman’s Everything Flows “’The history of life is the history of violence triumphant. Violence is eternal and indestructible’” (p. 86). Crepon characterizes this murderous consent through Camus as a form of Nihilism (pp. 22-24). Essentially the placidity, or complicity to violence happening elsewhere creates an illusion for people that what is happening in the background is “not their problem” (p. 28). This can be found for example in the social apathy we have towards nuclear armament, and to the consequences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (pp. 157-158). Crepon later calls this the utopian vision of our “nihilistic age” (p. 168), and it is this complicity that Crepon is looking to rectify.
To begin to rectify murderous consent Crepon looks to develop what he calls an ethicosmopolitics (p. 15). This ethicosmopolotics is centered around trying to return to and further develop the idea that human beings are worth preserving, and to avoid the all-too-common practice of triaging and passing value judgement on who deserves to live and who is fine to die. To begin his analysis of our engagement with murderous consent Crepon calls upon the work of Camus to help develop a notion of “rebellion” (pp. 43-44). This rebellion is not just a sense of pure lawlessness (p. 45), but rather an openness to examining, and re-examining what justice in society means. It also examines whether the current legal framework respects, and produces that kind of justice (p. 26). As mentioned in the quote from the beginning of the paper there is an “Ark of the Covenant” (p. 45) that needs to be developed that is congruent with our sense of justice. One assumption made here is that the consideration of murderous consent would necessarily be part of our definition of justice, and as such part of our legal and ethical systems along with our political framework. This is a reasonable assumption since the willingness to allow one to suffer would generally be considered unjust. Looking at all these points together it may be better to look at this “rebellion” proposed as a method to facilitate justice, rather than just a simple opposition to an existing legal, ethical and political frameworks. This then brings up the question of what Crepon is intending to do with the book.
Crepon does not expect practically to eliminate murderous consent fully, however the intention is to develop an ethical system that weighs its views against murderous consent and remove it as much as possible (p. 64). This system would then be used as part of the considerations both legally, ethically, and politically to inform the changes made in institutions. This ethicosmopolotics, as he calls it, requires us to open ourselves up to others and allow the sort of vulnerability that humanizes people we would otherwise fail to consider seriously like the homeless, or those in other countries. Crepon notes that development of this sort of an ethical system would be difficult, especially considering it requires us to contend with our potential complicity in actions that have been allowed to transpire (pp. 84-85). Crepon mentions through his analysis of Emmanuel Levinas that “’The impossibility of killing isn’t unreal, it’s moral’” (p. 100). Specifically, what’s being said here is that we have our individuality, or singularity as it’s put by Crepon, and that singularity is what allows us to engage in both murderous consent, and to avoid it (p. 91). It allows us to engage in it with multiple avenues, one specific example would be the freedom to otherize people through caricature.
Crepon notes that caricature, along with other methods of de-humanization allows us to insulate ourselves from serious ethical considerations for another person (p. 97). Namely because caricature allows us to strip the singularity of the person away, and we can engage with others as that caricature instead of as other individual beings (p. 98). In the example of the homeless people, it is easy to write them off socially as any number of caricatures to justify our complicity in their suffering. We can say someone deserves their suffering because we assume they are lazy, crazy, or stupid without individual analysis. Crepon likewise shares this concern for the desensitization that occurs in media such as video games, which actively numbs, and normalizes a high level of violence in his view (p. 167). By engaging with this caricature as opposed to the individual we can make it easier to engage in murderous consent, and in Crepon’s view makes the complicity to commit unethical actions much more likely and pseudo-justifiable (p. 97).
This stripping of singularity can perpetuate murderous consent, as such combatting murderous consent requires engaging in this ethicosmopolitical framework and protect both that singularity itself, and the respect for that singularity (p. 91, 96). There are several well fleshed out ways in which Crepon believes we have a foot in the door to develop this resilience to murderous consent he wants to develop. The first is that Crepon notes that we have a relation to the death of others (p. 64), whether it be regret, mourning, or any other negative relation. Likewise, Crepon singles out the notion of shame in relation to several situations, including Hiroshima (p. 155). This shame is something Crepon puts a fair amount of stock in as it can be a powerful catalyst for change in his view (pp. 157-158). The second idea being that one of the openings we are presented with to the singularity of others is through their face (p. 91). This idea is like the first, but much more specific. What Crepon argues is that when we see others faces we see them as other people, instead of the vague idea of a person, it is harder to engage in murderous consent (p. 99). Again, Crepon believes that the humanizing of others is what directly facilitates his ethicosmopolitics, and that a good way to recognize others as individuals is through their face. Both ideas are an opening point to allow the sort of empathetic and serious consideration for the consequences of our actions on others. Once we can open ourselves to this sort of empathy and incorporate it into ethical, political, and legal frameworks, we can begin to ameliorate the murderous consent we currently engage with.